Soviet offensive plans controversy

The Soviet offensive plans controversy refers to the debate among historians on the question of whether Joseph Stalin was planning to invade Germany prior to Operation Barbarossa.

Contents 1 Background 2 Suvorov, "Icebreaker", and the 1980s 2.1 Points 3 Reactions and critiques 3.1 Criticism 3.2 Middle positions 3.3 Support 3.4 Political implications of the debate 4 See also 5 Notes 6 Bibliography 6.1 Books by Viktor Suvorov 6.2 Books that support Soviet offensive plans existence 6.3 Books that oppose existence of Soviet offensive plans 6.4 Neutral, cautious approach 6.5 Other 7 References 8 External links

Background

Immediately after the German invasion of the USSR during World War II, Adolf Hitler put forward a thesis that the Red Army made extensive preparations for an offensive war in Europe, thus justifying the German invasion as a pre-emptive strike.^[1] After war this view was brought forward by some Wehrmacht leaders, like Wilhelm Keitel.^[2]

Suvorov, "Icebreaker", and the 1980s

In the 1980s, this thesis was reiterated by Victor Suvorov, a former officer of the Soviet military intelligence in his book Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War^[3] and several subsequent books. He argued that Soviet ground forces were extremely well organized, and were mobilizing en masse all along the German-Soviet border for a Soviet invasion of Europe slated for Sunday July 6, 1941, but they were totally unprepared for defensive operations on their own territory.

One of Suvorov's pieces of evidence favoring the theory of an impending Soviet attack was his claim regarding the maps and phrasebooks issued to Soviet troops. Military topographic maps, unlike other military supplies, are strictly local and cannot be used elsewhere than in the intended operational area. Suvorov claims Soviet units were issued with maps of Germany and German-occupied territory, and phrasebooks including questions about SA offices — SA offices were found only in German territory proper. In contrast, maps of Soviet territory were scarce. Notably, after the German attack, the officer responsible for maps, Lieutenant General M.K. Kudryavtsev was not punished by Stalin, who was known for extreme punishments after failures to obey his orders. According to Suvorov, this demonstrates that General Kudryavtsev was obeying the orders of Stalin, who simply did not expect a German attack.^[4]

Another piece of evidence, according to Suvorov, was the extensive effort Stalin took to conceal general mobilization by manipulation with the laws setting the conscription age. That allowed Stalin to provide the explosive build up of the Red Army. Since there was no universal military draft in the Soviet Union until 1939, by enacting the universal military draft on 1 September 1939, and by changing the minimum age for joining the Red Army from 21 to 18, Stalin triggered a mechanism of explosive increase of the military strength of the Red Army.

This specific law on mobilization allowed the Red Army to increase its army of 1.871.600 million men in 1939 to 5.081.000 million men in the spring of 1941 under secrecy to avoid alarming the rest of the world.^[5] 18 million reservists were also drafted. The duration of service was 2 years. Thus, according to supporters of the Soviet Union Offensive Plans Theory, the Red Army had to enter a war by 1 September 1941 or the drafted soldiers would have to be released from service.

Points

The main Suvorov's points were:

• The Soviet Union was intrinsically unstable, as any other communist regime must be. It had to expand to survive. According to the permanent revolution theory the communist system must expand and occupy the entire world to survive. Otherwise, it will fail in a peaceful and/or military struggle with surrounding “capitalist” countries. Stalin and other Soviet leaders had always understood this. It was publicly declared by Stalin that "the ultimate victory of socialism... can only be achieved on an international scale".^[6] Therefore, Soviet leaders started preparations for a massive war of aggression. However, to mislead the West, they officially declared an adherence to a more peaceful theory of Socialism in One Country, according to which Socialism can win in a single country, without being immediately overthrown by hostile "capitalist" neighbors. This leading country would then help revolutionary movements in other countries. Either way, the Soviet pre-war doctrine was based on Marxism-Leninism theory that capitalism will be overthrown through Communist revolution.

• The Soviet Union made extensive preparations for the future war of aggression during the 1920s and 1930s. Suvorov provides an extensive analysis of Stalin's preparation for war. Stalin, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union announced three phases that should lead to the final preparation for the war: three Five Year Plan phases, with the first one focused on collectivization, the second focused on industrialization, and the third phase emphasized the militarization of the country.

• Stalin escalated tensions in Europe by providing a combination of economic and military support to Hitler. (see Soviet-German relations before 1941). Stalin's plan and vision was that Hitler's predictability and his violent reactionary ideas made him a candidate to the role of "icebreaker" for the Communist revolution. By starting wars with European countries, Hitler would warrant the USSR joining World War II by attacking Nazi Germany and "liberating" and Sovietizing all of Europe. It is generally accepted that "from the early 1920s until 1933, the Soviet Union was engaged in secret collaboration with the German military to enable it to circumvent the provisions of the Versailles Treaty", which prohibited Germany's military production.^[7] Moscow allowed the Germans to produce and test their weapons on Soviet territory, while some Red Army officers attended general-staff courses in Germany.^[7] In 1932–1933, "Stalin helped Hitler come to power, by forbidding German Communists to make common cause with the Social Democrats against the Nazis in parliamentary elections".^[7] When concluding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, Stalin "clearly counted on the repetition of the 1914–1918 war of attrition, which would leave the "capitalist" countries so exhausted that the USSR could sweep into Europe virtually unopposed"^[7] (see also Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939).

Stalin always planned to exploit the military conflict between the "capitalist" countries to his advantage. He said as early as in 1925 that

"Struggles, conflicts and wars among our enemies are...our great ally...and the greatest supporter of our government and our revolution" and "If a war does break out, we will not sit with folded arms – we will have to take the field, but we will be last to do so. And we shall do so in order to throw the decisive load on the scale"^[7]

• World War II was initiated by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany which became allies after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The essence of this pact was in the secret protocols which divided Europe into zones of influence, and removed the Polish buffer between Germany and the USSR. Some countries that fell into the Soviet zone of influence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, were occupied. The difference between these smaller nations, occupied and annexed by the USSR, and Poland initially attacked by Germany was that Poland had military assistance guarantees from Great Britain and France.

• Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany from the rear in July 1941, only a few weeks after the date on which the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union took place. According to Suvorov, the Red Army had been already redeployed from a defensive to an offensive position. As described in Suvorov's books, Stalin had made no major defensive preparations. On the contrary, the Stalin line fortifications through Belarus-Ukraine were dismantled, and the new Molotov line was all but finished by the time of Nazi invasion.

• Hitler's intelligence identified USSR's preparations to attack Germany. Therefore, the Wehrmacht had drafted a preemptive war plan based on Hitler's orders as early as mid-1940, soon after the Soviet annexations of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. On June 22, 1941 Hitler began an assault on the USSR.

Reactions and critiques

While most agree that Stalin made extensive preparations for an upcoming war and exploited the military conflict in Europe to his advantage, the assertions that Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany in the summer of 1941, and that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike by Hitler, are generally discounted.^[8]

In some countries, particularly in Russia, Germany and Israel, Suvorov's thesis has jumped the bounds of academic discourse and captured the imagination of the public.^[1] Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz,^[9] Russian military historians Makhmut Gareev and Lev Bezymensky, and perhaps his most vehement Russian opponent Alexei Isayev,^[10] the author of Anti-Suvorov. Many other western scholars, such as Teddy J. Uldricks,^[1] Derek Watson,^[11] Hugh Ragsdale,^[12] Roger Reese,^[13] Stephen Blank,^[14] Robin Edmonds,^[15] agree that the major Suvorov's writings rest circumstantial evidences,^[16] or even on "virtually no evidentiary base"^{[1] [17]} According to Jonathan Haslam, Suvorov's claim that "Germany frustrated Stalin's war"^[18] "would be comical were it not taken so seriously".^[19] Late Soviet emigre historian Alexandr Nekrich (extremely critical of Stalin in other contexts) also rejected major Suvorov ideas as unsubstantiated and contrary to the broader Stalin's policy.^[20]

Nevertheless, studies of some historians, e.g. Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov (“Stalin's Missed Chance”) gave partial support to the claim that Soviet forces were concentrating in order to attack Germany. Other historians who support this thesis are Vladimir Nevezhin, Boris Sokolov, Valeri Danilov, Joachim Hoffmann^[21] and Mark Solonin.^[22] Offensive interpretation of Stalin's prewar planning is also supported by Sovietologist Robert C. Tucker and Pavel Bobylev.^[23] Moreover, it is argued by Hoffmann that the actual Soviet troop concentrations were near the border, just like fuel depots and airfields. All of this is claimed to be unsuitable for defensive operations.^[24]

Strength of the opposing forces on the
Soviet Western border. June 22, 1941

	Germany and Allies	Soviet Union	Ratio
Divisions	166	190	1 : 1.1
Personnel	4,306,800	3,289,851	1.3 : 1
Guns and mortars	42,601	59,787	1 : 1.4
Tanks (incl assault guns)	4,171	15,687	1 : 3.8
Aircraft	4,389[25]	11, 537[26]	1 : 2.6

Source: Mikhail Meltyukhov “Stalin's Missed Chance” table 47,^[27]

Supporters of Soviet offensive plans theory also refer to some recently discovered facts, e.g., publication of Georgy Zhukov's proposal of May 15, 1941,^[28] which called for a Soviet strike against Germany. This document suggested secret mobilization and deploying Red Army troops next to the western border, under the cover of training.^[29] However, Robin Edmonds argued that RKKA's planning staff would not have been doing its job well if it had not considered a potential possibility of a pre-emptive strike against Wehrmacht,^[15] whereas Teddy J. Uldricks pointed out that there is no documentary evidence that this Zhukov's proposal was accepted by Stalin.^[1] Another piece of evidence is a recently discovered Stalin's speech on the 5 May 1941 when he revealed his mind to graduating military cadets.^[30] He proclaimed: "A good defense signifies the need to attack. Attack is the best form of defense... We must now conduct a peaceful, defensive policy with attack. Yes, defense with attack. We must now re-teach our army and commanders. Educate them in the spirit of attack".^[31] However, according to Michael Jabara Carley, this speech could be equally interpreted as a deliberate attempt to discourage the Germans from launching the war.^[32]

Other Russian historians, Iu. Gor'kov, A.S. Orlov, Iu. A. Polyakov, Dmitri Volkogonov analyzed newly available evidence to demonstrate that Soviet forces were certainly not ready for the attack.^[1]

According to Meltyukhov, the January 1941 strategic war games on 'Northern' and 'Southern' variants (conducted respectively on January 2–6 and Jan. 8-11 1941, as also depicted in articles by Pavel Bobylev^[33]) did indeed assume that the forces of the 'East' (i.e. USSR) at first had to repel an assault by the 'West' (i.e. Germany), no concrete actions on how this could take place were covered. Instead, the war games concentrated on the Soviet 'counterattack'. As the attack of the forces of the 'East' was more successful in the Southern variant, this area was chosen as the main direction of Soviet forces.^[34]

Criticism

Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz,^[35] and Russian military historians Makhmut Gareev, Lev Bezymensky and Dmitri Volkogonov. Many other western scholars, such as Teddy J. Uldricks,^[1] Derek Watson,^[36] Hugh Ragsdale,^[37] Roger Reese,^[38] Stephen Blank,^[39] Robin Edmonds,^[40] agree that the major Suvorov's weakness is "that the author does not reveal his sources" (Ingmar Oldberg^[41]) Cynthia A. Roberts is even more categorical, claiming that Suvorov's writings are based on "virtually no evidentiary base".^[42]

The most controversial Suvorov's thesis is that the Red Army made extensive preparations for an offensive war in Europe, but it was totally unprepared for defensive operations on its own territory.^[1] Thereby Suvorov essentially reiterates the argument put forward by Adolf Hitler in 1941.^[1] According to Jonathan Haslam, Suvorov's claim that "Germany frustrated Stalin's war"^[18] "would be comical were it not taken so seriously".^[43]

Suvorov reluctantly reveals his sources,^[17] and much of his thesis is based on circumstantial evidence.^[44] Thus, one of Suvorov arguments is that certain types of weapons were mostly suited for offensive warfare and that the Red Army had large numbers of such weapons. For example, he pointed out that the Soviet Union was outfitting large numbers of paratroopers — preparing to field entire parachute armies, in fact — and that paratroopers are only suitable for offensive action, which the Soviet military doctrine of the time recognized. Suvorov's critics say that paratroopers were used in defensive actions and that Soviet paratroopers were poorly trained and armed.^[45] In like fashion, Suvorov cites the development of the KT/A-40 Antonov "flying tank" as evidence of Stalin's aggressive plans, while his critics say that development of this tank was started only in December 1941.^[46]

David M. Glantz disputes the argument that the Red Army was deployed in an offensive stance in 1941. Glantz demonstrated that the Red Army was only in a state of partial mobilization in July 1941, from which neither effective defensive or offensive actions could be offered without considerable delay.

Middle positions

In a 1987 article in the Historische Zeitschrift journal, the German historian Klaus Hildebrand argued that both Hitler and Stalin separately were planning to attack each other in 1941.^[47] In Hildebrand’s opinion, the news of Red Army concentrations near the border led to Hitler engaging in a Flucht nach vorn ("flight forward"-i.e. responding to a danger by charging on rather than retreating).^[47] Hildebrand wrote "Independently, the National Socialist program of conquest met the equally far-reaching war-aims program which Stalin had drawn up in 1940 at the latest".^[47] Hildebrand's views could be considered as a median viewpoint in the preventive war debate.

A middle position seems to be taken by the Israeli historian Martin van Creveld. In an interview in the April 11, 2005 edition of the German news magazine FOCUS, which is the second largest weekly magazine in Germany, he said: "I doubt that Stalin wanted to attack as early as autumn 1941, as some writers argue. But I have no doubt that sooner or later, if Germany would have been entangled in a war with Great Britain and the U.S., he would have taken what he wanted. Judging by the talks between Ribbentrop and Molotov in November 1940, this would have been Romania, Bulgaria, an access to the North Sea, the Dardanelles and probably those parts of Poland that were under German control at that time." Asked to what degree the leaders of the Wehrmacht needed to feel threatened by the Soviet military buildup, van Creveld replies "very much" and adds: "In 1941, the Red Army was the largest army in the world. Stalin may, as I said, not have planned to attack Germany in autumn 1941. But it would be hard to believe that he would not have taken the opportunity to stab the Reich in the back sometime."^[48]

Support

While some Western researchers (two exceptions being Albert L. Weeks^[49] and R. C. Raack ^[50][51][52]) ignored Suvorov's thesis,^[53] he has gathered some support among Russian professional historians, starting in the 1990s. Support for Suvorov's claim that Stalin had been preparing a strike against Hitler in 1941 began to emerge as some archive materials were declassified. Authors supporting the Stalin 1941 assault thesis are Valeri Danilov,^[54] V.A. Nevezhin,^[55] Constantine Pleshakov, Mark Solonin^[56] and Boris Sokolov.^[57] As the latter has noted, the absence of documents with the precise date of the planned Soviet invasion can't be an argument in favor of the claim that this invasion was not planned at all. Although the USSR attacked Finland, no documents found to date which would indicate November 26, 1939 as the previously assumed date for beginning of the provocations or November 30 as the date of the planned Soviet assault.^[58]

The existence of the plan was supported by Edvard Radzinsky who noted that a document about the Soviet surprise attack on Nazi Germany was actually found and preserved in the Military-Memorial Center of the Soviet General Staff.^[29] That was a draft drawn up by Georgy Zhukov, dated May 15, 1941, and signed by Aleksandr Vasilevsky and Nikolai Vatutin. The document stated:

"In view of the fact that Germany at present keeps its army fully mobilized with its rear services deployed, it has the capacity of deploying ahead of us and striking a sudden blow. To prevent this I consider it important not to leave the operational initiative to the German command in any circumstances, but to anticipate the enemy and attack the German army at the moment when it is in the process of deploying and before it has time to organize its front and the coordination of its various arms".

The plan drafted by the Soviet command included a secret mobilization of the Soviet forces at the Western frontier. The objective of the offensive operation was to cut Germany off its allies, and especially Romania with its oil required for Germany to wage war. The document about attack on Germany and Romania was also noted by Dmitri Volkogonov who however did not consider it as a final proof of the Soviet intentions.

One of views was expressed by Mikhail Meltyukhov in his study Stalin's Missed Chance.^[59] The author states that the idea for striking Germany arose long before May 1941, and was the very basis of Soviet military planning from 1940 to 1941. Providing additional support for this thesis is that no significant defense plans have been found.^[60] In his argument, Meltyukhov covers five different versions of the assault plan (“Considerations on the Strategical Deployment of Soviet Troops in Case of War with Germany and its Allies” (Russian original)), the first version of which was developed soon after the outbreak of World War II. The last version was to be completed by May 1, 1941.^[61] Even the deployment of troops was chosen in the South, which would have been more beneficial in case of a Soviet assault.^[62]

Mark Solonin presents that several variants of the war plan against Germany existed since at least August 1940 , although the differences between them were slight. Solonin also notes that no other plans for Red Army deployment in 1941 has been found so far. ^[63]

In Stalin's War of Extermination, Joachim Hoffmann made extensive use of interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war, ranging in rank from general to private, conducted by their German captors during the war. The book is also based on open-source, unclassified literature and recently declassified materials. Based on this material, Hoffmann argues that the Soviet Union was making final preparations for its own attack when the Wehrmacht struck. He also remarked that Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941 had long been known and analyzed. Danilov and Heinz Magenheimer examined this plan and other documents which might indicate Soviet preparations for an attack in the early 1990s in the Austrian military journal (Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, nos. 5 and 6, 1991; no. 1, 1993; and no. 1, 1994). Both researchers came to the conclusion that Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941 reflected Stalin's May 5, 1941 speech heralding the birth of the new offensive Red Army.

In 2006, a collection of articles (entitled The Truth of Viktor Suvorov) by various historians who share some views with Suvorov was published.^[64] It was followed by sequels; six as of September 2010. In a 2009 essay entitled "Don’t Blame Hitler Alone For World War II", journalist Eric Margolis endorsed Suvorov's assertion that Operation Barbarossa was a "preventive war" forced on Hitler by alleged impending Soviet attack, and that it is wrong to give Hitler "total blame" for World War II.^[65]

Several politicians have also made claims similar to Suvorov's. On August 20, 2004, historian and former Prime Minister of Estonia Mart Laar published an article in The Wall Street Journal titled When Will Russia Say 'Sorry'?. In this article he said: "The new evidence shows that by encouraging Hitler to start World War II, Stalin hoped to simultaneously ignite a world-wide revolution and conquer all of Europe". Another former statesman to share his views of a purported Soviet aggression plan is Mauno Koivisto, who wrote: "It seems to be clear the Soviet Union was not ready for defense in the summer of 1941, but it was rather preparing for an assault....The forces mobilized in the Soviet Union were not positioned for defensive, but for offensive aims." Koivisto concludes: "Hitler's invasion forces didn't outnumber [the Soviets], but were rather outnumbered themselves. The Soviets were unable to organize defenses. The troops were provided with maps that covered territories outside the Soviet Union."^[66]

Political implications of the debate

Although the debate concerns the events of more than a half-a-century-old history, it can indirectly affect contemporary public sentiments about the true nature of the best known and much praised historical collaboration between the Democratic and Communist regimes. Preserving the officially accepted model of the Second World War (that Hitler was the sole initiator of the war, that Stalin tried to avoid the war, and that the collaboration of the leading Western democracies with Stalin's authoritarian regime was justified by the events of the time) is arguably more acceptable for most of the world's historians and general public, both Western and Eastern. On the contrary, the new historical model of the Second World War (that Stalin was the active supporter of Hitler's aggressive plans for the world war, that Stalin was planning to use the World War to his own advantage to further spreading of the communist ideology, and most importantly, that Stalin manipulated both Hitler and Western leaders to his own advantage) might upset both professional historians and people's sentiments in both Western and Eastern countries.

See also

• Operation Barbarossa
• Eastern Front (World War II)
• Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact
• German–Soviet Axis talks
• Molotov Line – An incomplete Soviet defense line at the start of Operation Barbarossa
• Stalin Line – Soviet defense line that was abandoned before Operation Barbarossa
• Mark Solonin
• Stalin's Missed Chance
• Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939

Notes

Bibliography

Books by Viktor Suvorov

• The series about the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet War
  • Icebreaker (Ледокол) 1990, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-12622-3
  • Day "M" (День "М")
  • Suicide. For what reason Hitler attacked the Soviet Union? (Самоубийство), Moscow, ACT, 2000, ISBN 5-17-003119-X
  • Last Republic, ACT, 1997, ISBN 5-12-000367-2.
  • The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008 (hardcover, ISBN 978-1-59114-838-8).
• Aquarium (Аквариум), 1985, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-11545-0
• Inside the Soviet Army, 1982, Macmillan Publishing Co.
• The Liberators, 1981, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-10675-3
• Shadow of Victory (Тень победы), questions the image of Georgy Zhukov. The first book of trilogy with the same name.
• I Take My Words Back (Беру Свои Слова Обратно), questions the image of Georgy Zhukov. The second book of "Shadow of Victory" trilogy.
• Cleansing (Очищение). Why did Stalin behead his army?, Moscow, 2002, ISBN 5-17-009254-7
• Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, 1984, ISBN 0-02-615510-9
• Spetsnaz, 1987, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-11961-8

Books that support Soviet offensive plans existence

• Dębski, Sławomir. Między Berlinem a Moskwą: Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939–1941. Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2003 (ISBN 83-918046-2-3).
  • • Reviewed by R.C. Raack in The Russian Review, 2004, Vol. 63, Issue 4, pp. 718–719.
• Edwards, James B. Hitler: Stalin's Stooge. San Diego, CA: Aventine Press, 2004 (ISBN 978-1593301446, paperback).
• Hoffmann, Joachim. Stalin's War of Extermination. Capshaw, AL: Theses & Dissertations Press, 2001 (ISBN 0-9679856-8-4).
• Maser, Werner Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Olzog, München 1994. ISBN 3-7892-8260-X
  • Fälschung, Dichtung und Wahrheit über Hitler und Stalin, Olzog, München 2004. ISBN 3-7892-8134-4
• Pleshakov, Constantine. Stalin's Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War Two on the Eastern Front. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005 (ISBN 0-618-36701-2).
  • • Reviewed by Ron Laurenzo in The Washington Times, May 22, 2005.
    • Reviewed by Robert Citino in World War II, Vol. 21, Issue 1. (2006), pp. 76–77.
• Raack, R.C. "Did Stalin Plan a Drang Nach Westen?", World Affairs. Vol. 155, Issue 4. (Summer 1992), pp. 13–21.
  • Preventive Wars?" [Review Essay of Pietrow-Ennker, Bianka, ed. Präventivkrieg? Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. 3d ed. Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000. ISBN 3-596-14497-3; Mel'tiukhov, Mikhail. Upushchennyi shans Stalina: Sovetskii Soiuz i bor'ba za Evropu 1939–1941. Moscow: Veche, 2000. ISBN 5-7838-1196-3; Magenheimer, Heinz. Entscheidungskampf 1941: Sowjetische Kriegsvorbereitungen. Aufmarsch. Zusammenstoss. Bielefeld: Osning Verlag, 2000. ISBN 3-9806268-1-4] The Russian Review, 2004, Vol. 63, Issue 1, pp. 134–137.
  • "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: Opening the Closet Door on a Key Chapter of Recent History", World Affairs. Vol. 158, Issue 4, 1996, pp. 198–211.
  • "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: The International Debate Goes On", World Affairs. Vol. 159, Issue 2, 1996, pp. 47–54.
  • Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. (ISBN 0-8047-2415-6).
  • "Stalin's Plans for World War Two Told by a High Comintern Source", The Historical Journal, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Dec., 1995), pp. 1031–1036.
  • "Breakers on the Stalin Wave: Review Essay [of Murphy, David E. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005 (ISBN 0-300-10780-3); Pleshakov, Constantine. Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War II on the Eastern Front. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 2005 (ISBN 0-618-36701-2)]", The Russian Review, Vol. 65, No. 3. (2006), pp. 512–515.
• Solonin Mark «22 июня, или когда началась Великая Отечественная война?» — Moscow: «Яуза», «Эксмо». 2007. ISBN 5-699-15196-6
  • «23 июня: „День М“» — Moscow: «Яуза», «Эксмо». 2007 ISBN 978-5-699-22304-6
  • «25 июня. Глупость или агрессия?» — Moscow: «Яуза», «Эксмо». 2008. ISBN 978-5-699-25300-5
• Topitsch, Ernst. Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987 (ISBN 0-312-00989-5).
  • • Reviewed critically by Alexander Dallin in The New York Times, November 15, 1987.
• Weeks, Albert L. Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002 (hardcover; ISBN 0-7425-2191-5); 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0-7425-2192-3).

Books that oppose existence of Soviet offensive plans

• Acton, Edward. "Understanding Stalin’s Catastrophe: [Review Article]", Journal of Contemporary History, 2001, Vol. 36(3), pp. 531–540.
• Carley, Michael Jabara. "Soviet Foreign Policy in the West, 1936–1941: A Review Article", Europe–Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7. (2004), pp. 1081–1100. [Review of Silvio Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 1936–1941. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002 and Albert L. Weeks, Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941. Oxford and Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.]
• Erickson, John. "Barbarossa June 1941: Who Attacked Whom?" History Today, July 2001, Vol. 51, Issue 7, pp. 11–17. online text
• Edmonds, Robin. "[Review: Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?", International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4. (Oct., 1990), p. 812.
• Glantz, David M. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998 (ISBN 0-7006-0879-6).
  • Reviewed by David R. Costello in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1. (Jan., 1999), pp. 207–208.
  • Reviewed by Roger Reese in Slavic Review, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Spring, 2000), p. 227.
• Glantz, David M. "[Review: Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?", The Journal of Military History, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Apr., 1991), pp. 263–264.
• Gorodetsky, Gabriel. Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1999 (ISBN 0-300-07792-0).
  • Reviewed by David R. Costello in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 580–582.
  • Reviewed by Stephen Blank in The Russian Review, 2000, Vol. 59, Issue 2, pp. 310–311.
  • Reviewed by Hugh Ragsdale in Slavic Review, Vol. 59, No. 2. (Summer, 2000), pp. 466–467.
  • Reviewed by Evan Mawdsley in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3. (May, 2000), pp. 579–580.
• Harms, Karl. "The Military Doctrine of the Red Army on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War: Myths and Facts", Military Thought, Vol. 13, No. 03. (2004), pp. 227–237.
• Haslam, Jonathan. "Soviet–German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out [Review Article]", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 785–797.
• Humpert, David M. "Viktor Suvorov and Operation Barbarossa: Tukhachevskii Revisited." The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 18, Issue 1. (2005), pp. 59–74.
• Lukacs, John. June 1941: Hitler and Stalin. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2006 (ISBN 0-300-11437-0).
• McDermott, Kevin. Stalin: Revolutionary in an Era of War (European History in Perspective). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 0-333-71121-1; paperback, ISBN 0-333-71122-X).
• Murphy, David E. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2005 (ISBN 0-300-10780-3).
  • Reviewed by Robert Conquest at The American Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2. (2006), p. 591.
  • Reviewed by Raymond W. Leonard in the Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 37, No. 1. (2006), pp. 128–129.
• Neilson, Keith. "Stalin's Moustache: The Soviet Union and the Coming of War: [Review Article]", Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 12, No. 2. (2001), pp. 197–208.
• Roberts, Cynthia A. "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 8. (Dec., 1995), pp. 1293–1326.
• Rotundo, Louis. "Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War. (Apr., 1989), pp. 277–299.
• Gerd R. Ueberschär, Lev A. Bezymenskij (Hrsg.): Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941. Die Kontroverse um die Präventivkriegsthese Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft, Darmstadt 1998
• Uldricks, Teddy J. "The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?" The Slavic Review, 1999, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 626–643.

Neutral, cautious approach

• Keep, John L.H.; Litvin, Alter L. Stalinism: Russian and Western Views at the Turn of the Millennium (Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions). New York: Routledge, 2004 (hardcover, ISBN 0-415-35108-1); 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-415-35109-X). See chapter 5, "Foreign policy".

Other

• The Attack on the Soviet Union (Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV) by Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ewald Osers, Louise Wilmott, Dean S. McMurray (Editors), Ernst Klink (Translator), Rolf-Dieter Müller (Translator), Gerd R. Ueberschär (Translator). New York: Oxford University Press (USA), 1999 (ISBN 0-19-822886-4).
• Carley, Michael Jabara. "Soviet Foreign Policy in the West, 1936–1941: A Review Article", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7. (2004), pp. 1081–1100.
• Drabkin, Ia.S. "'Hitler’s War' or 'Stalin’s War'?", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 5. (2002), pp. 5–30.
• Ericson, Edward E., III. "Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi–Soviet Relations, 1936–1941", German Studies Review, Vol. 21, No. 2. (May, 1998), pp. 263–283.
• Förster, Jürgen; Mawdsley, Evan. "Hitler and Stalin in Perspective: Secret Speeches on the Eve of Barbarossa", War in History, Vol. 11, Issue 1. (2004), pp. 61–103.
• Haslam, Jonathan. "Stalin and the German Invasion of Russian 1941: A Failure of Reasons of State?", International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1. (Jan., 2000), pp. 133–139.
• Koch, H.W. "Operation Barbarossa—The Current State of the Debate", The Historical Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 377–390.
• Litvin, Alter L. Writing History in Twentieth-Century Russia: A View from Within, translated and edited by John L.H. Keep. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 (hardcover, ISBN 0-333-76487-0).
• Melyukhov M.I. (2000) Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 1939–1941 (electronic version of the book) For a review of the book, see [3]), Moscow, Вече
• Roberts, Geoffrey. "On Soviet–German Relations: The Debate Continues [A Review Article]", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 8. (Dec., 1998), pp. 1471–1475.
• Vasquez, John A. "The Causes of the Second World War in Europe: A New Scientific Explanation", International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 161–178.
• Ziemke, Earl F. The Red Army, 1918–1941: From Vanguard of World Revolution to America's Ally. London; New York: Frank Cass, 2004 (ISBN 0-7146-5551-1).

References